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ABSTRACT 
This paper tests the policitcal dimensions of the presidential cycle effect in U.S. 
financial markets. The presidential cycle effect states that average stock market 
returns are significantly higher in the last two years compared to the first two 
years of a presidential term. We confirm the robust existence of this cycle in U.S. 
stock markets as well as bond markets. As most rational theories to explain the 
cycle were falsified by earlier empirical work, this paper sets out to test the 
presidential cycle election (PCE) theory as an alternative explanation. The PCE 
theory states that incumbent parties and presidents have an incentive to 
manipulate the economy (via budget expansions, taxes, etc.) to remain in power. 
We formulate seven different propositions relating to fiscal, monetary, tax, and 
political implications of PCE theory. We find no statistically significant evidence 
confirming the PCE theory as a plausible explanation for the presidential cycle 
effect. The existence of the presidential cycle effect in U.S. financial markets 
thus remains a puzzle that cannot be easily explained by politicians mis-using 
their economic influence to remain in power.  
 
Keywords: political economy, inefficient markets, market anomalies, calendar effects. 
JEL Classifications: G14, P16, E32. 
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I. Introduction 
 
The presidential cycle effect in U.S. stock market returns consists of higher stock market 
returns during the second half of a presidential term compared to the first. Huang (1985) reports that 
trading strategies based on this presidential cycle, i.e. switching out of stocks and into Treasury bills 
during the first and second years of the presidential cycle, produced returns superior to a traditional 
buy-and-hold strategy. Foerster and Schmitz (1997) examine each year of the presidential cycle 
individually and conclude that U.S. stock market returns are significantly lower in the second year of 
the presidential term, compared to the other three years. However, much about the influence of the 
presidential cycle on U.S. stock markets still remains unclear. 
The key puzzle is why precisely there is a correlation between the presidential cycle and stock 
market returns in the first place. Several explanations have been put forward. First, the presidential 
cycle might merely proxy for variations in expected returns due to business cycle fluctuations. Booth 
and Booth (2003) find that this is not true. Second, the relationship between the presidential cycle and 
stock market returns could be concentrated around and limited to election dates. However, Santa-Clara 
and Valkanov (2003) find no significant evidence of stock price changes immediately before, during, 
or immediately after elections. Third, the difference in returns during the presidential cycle might be a 
compensation for risk. Market volatility could simply be higher in the second half of the cycle, thereby 
explaining the higher returns. However, Campbell and Li, (2004) indicate that the differences in 
returns cannot be explained by differences in market volatility. Finally, the presidential cycle effect 
might be driven by the impact of outliers. Gärtner and Wellershoff (1995) as well as Foerster and 
Schmitz (1997) find that the effect is not driven by individual outliers in the data, such as the October 
1987 stock market crash. 
Since most rational explanations fail to provide an adequate answer, the presidential cycle 
election theory2 has been put forward as an alternative. This theory is based on the macro-economic 
political business cycle (PBC) theory by Nordhaus (1975) and MacRae (1977). The PBC theory states 
that business conditions are often manipulated by political parties trying to win elections. Nordhaus 
(1975) argues that presidential administrations have an incentive to stimulate the economy prior to the 
elections and to pursue deflationary policies after the elections, regardless of the political orientation 
of the incumbent administration. Furthermore, Rogoff (1990) argues that political budget cycles 
developed by that government tend to increase spending (especially toward projects with high 
immediate visibility), cut taxes, and raise transfers prior to and during election years. Studies by 
Chappell and Keech (1986) and Alesina and Sachs (1988) show the significant interactions between 
macroeconomic outcomes and presidential administrations, while Tufte (1978) and Haynes and Stone 
(1988) find some empirical evidence for the existence of a PBC. The PBC theory is also supported by 
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Fair (1982), who developed a model for voting behaviour. His model indicates that voters do not look 
back more than a year or two in judging the economic performance of an administration. This would 
give presidents an incentive to manipulate the economy prior to the elections, since the myopic 
electorate only judges the administration on its last years.   
The presidential cycle election theory, popularized by Hirsch and Hirsch (2007), extends this 
PBC theory and states that the incumbent president would impose stimulative fiscal measures and 
corporate friendly policies to create a favorable voting environment close to elections. This results in 
an increase in federal spending, less regulation, lower taxes and an increasing growth of money 
supply. Investors become confident and optimistic about the upcoming election, anticipating that the 
new president will bring new prosperity in the market place. This would lead to a bullish stock market 
in the second half of a presidential term. After the election, when the sentiment of the anticipation goes 
down, investors are patiently waiting to see what will happen in the new administration. Usually, the 
first year of the presidential term is a quiet period where the new administration is facing a steep 
learning curve. The second year of the presidential term is the ‘let-down’ year where investors are 
disappointed with the presidents for not keeping their election campaign promises or for seeing the 
promises being brought down by Congress. These sentiments, coupled with the fact that the price for 
the stimulative policies conducted prior to the elections have to be countered with post-election 
deflationary measures, would inevitably lead to a bearish stock market in the first half of the cycle.  
The present study examines the impact of this presidential cycle effect on U.S. financial 
markets and empirically tests the most plausible explanation for this effect, the so-called presidential 
cycle election theory. Using 1948-2004 data, this study finds a clear presidential cycle effect in both 
U.S. stock and bond markets. Average excess returns of the S&P 500 in the second half of the 
presidential cycle are significantly higher compared to those in the first half of the cycle. The second 
year underperforms the other years in the cycle by 9.5 percent, while the third year outperforms the 
other years by 13.8 percent. Both findings are statistically significant and confirm earlier findings in 
the literature.  
Stock returns may be influenced by business cycle fluctuations. We control for this by 
including four traditional business cycle proxies in our regressions: the dividend yield, term spread, 
quality spread, and the relative interest rate. We also conduct a bootstrap procedure to control for the 
finite-sample behavior of our inference procedure. All of our findings remain robust.  
 Using U.S. credit spreads, we also find that bond markets show a clear presidential cycle 
pattern. Again, the pattern is most visible in the second and third year of the cycle. On average, the 
credit spread widens by 48 basis points during the second year of the cycle and shrinks by 45 basis 
points during the third year of the cycle. Both findings are statistically significant and robust to the 
inclusion of business cycle controls. 
We proceed by empirically investigating whether the presidential cycle effect can be explained 
by the presidential cycle election (PCE) theory. We do so by testing seven propositions.  We thus 
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significantly extend previous literature by being the first to empirically examine the presidential cycle 
pattern beyond the scope of financial variables only. We do so by also focusing on fiscal, political, and 
macroeconomic variables. Our first four propositions have a financial, fiscal or macro-economic 
character and focus on any potential economic manipulation by an incumbent president. Accelerating 
growth of money supply, lowering U.S. income tax levels or raising U.S. federal spending are 
examples of popular presidential manipulations stated by the PCE theory. We find, however, little 
evidence for any such presidential manipulation of the economy. 
Our final three propositions address the political mechanisms behind the presidential cycle 
effect. The partisanship of the president appears to have no significant impact on the strength of the 
presidential cycle effect. This is supportive for the PCE theory, which states that presidential 
administrations have the same incentive when manipulating the economy (namely enhancing their 
chances on re-election), regardless of their political orientation. Analyzing the impact of the 
partisanship of the majority of Congress on the strength of the presidential cycle effect produces some 
surprising results. We find no Congressional influence on the strength of the presidential cycle effect. 
This lack of influence is at odds with the PCE theory and diminishes its political credibility. As a final 
check, we investigate whether the re-eligible or non-eligible status of an incumbent president has any 
impact on the presidential cycle effect. One would expect more economic manipulation when there is 
a re-eligible president in office, since he is still up for re-election. However, the empirical findings 
indicate no statistically significant difference in the presidential cycle effect under a re-eligible or non-
eligible president. We conclude that there is little empirical evidence in support of the PCE theory as a 
sound explanation for the presidential cycle effect. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section II introduces the data and 
variables used in this study. The empirical findings on the presence of the presidential cycle effect in 
U.S. stock and bond markets are presented in Section III. The seven propositions of the PCE theory 
are presented and empirically tested in Section IV. The main conclusions are presented in Section V, 
which also sets out the agenda for future research.  
 
II. Data 
 
Following Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003), the data are categorized into financial variables, 
political variables and control variables. All series are at a monthly frequency, except the series on tax 
levels, federal spending and the budget surplus, which are annual. The entire sample period, 1948:11-
2004:10, contains 672 monthly observations and consists of 14 full presidential cycles. Table I 
provides the summary statistics for the financial and control variables used in this study. 
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A. Financial Variables 
 
The log monthly returns of the value-weighted portfolio of the S&P 500 (SP500) are obtained 
from Robert Shiller’s website3 and used to form excess (SP500 – TBL) and real (SP500 – INF) returns 
of the S&P 500.  The log interest rate (TBL) is computed from the three-month Treasury bill, obtained 
via the website of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED). INF is the log monthly inflation, 
which is obtained from Robert Shiller’s website as well. The monthly change in credit spread (Credit 
spread) is used to analyze the U.S. bond market. It is defined as the difference between the yield on 
BAA-rated corporate bonds and the yield on long-term government bonds (10-year Treasury note), 
which are both obtained from FRED. M1 growth indicates the yearly growth of money supply (M1) 
and is obtained from FRED. The U.S. income tax levels (with Tax low and Tax high representing the 
average lowest and highest U.S. income tax bracket) and the change in all tax levels (with Tax change 
representing the change in all of the U.S. income tax brackets) are obtained from the Joint Committee 
on Taxation. Federal spending (Fed. spending) indicates the annual change in U.S. federal spending, 
where federal spending is defined as the total of on- and off-budget federal outlays. The change in the 
U.S. budget surplus is denoted as a percentage of U.S. gross domestic product (Budget surplus / GDP) 
and as a percentage of U.S. total debt (Budget surplus / Total debt). If a budget surplus coefficient has 
a positive sign during a specific year of the presidential cycle, this indicates that the budget surplus  
increased (or the deficit decreased), thus implying that, on average, federal receipts were larger than 
federal outlays during that specific year of the cycle. Series on federal spending and the budget surplus 
are obtained from the budget of the United States government 2005.  
 
B. Political Variables 
 
The U.S. elections are held once every four years in the beginning of November.4 Like 
Foerster and Schmitz (1997), no presidential changes other than the mandated elections are taken into 
account, since these events have not resulted in a new election cycle or an administration change. 
Since the elections are always held around the same date, the first year of the four-year election cycle 
is defined as the twelve months starting November 1 of a U.S. election year and ending October 31 of 
the next year. The three other years of the election cycle are defined in a similar way. The following 
dummy variables are defined to test for the presidential cycle effect: YRit  = 1 when it is the ith year of 
a presidential cycle at time t, and zero otherwise for i = 1,..,4. In order to test for the difference in the 
strength of the presidential cycle under a Democratic or Republican president we define DPt  = 1 when 
a Democratic president is in office at time t, and zero otherwise. Similarly, RPt  indicates when a 
Republican president is in office.  
                                               
3
 http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm. 
4
 We also perform robustness checks starting the cycle in January when the new president actually obtains 
executive powers. This does not affect the main results, see the next section.  
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The U.S. Congress is the bicameral legislature of the federal government, consisting of two 
houses, namely the U.S. Senate and the House of Representatives. This study focuses on the 
relationship between the president and the Senate only, since the president acts by and with the advice 
and consent of the Senate. Furthermore, the Senate is the only house with a Committee on Finance. 
Congressional elections are held once every two years in November. So half of the Congressional 
elections coincide with the presidential elections, while the other half are mid-term elections. 
Congressional elections are always held for one-third of the Senate, which usually results in a partisan 
switch of control. We define the following dummy variables to test the difference in the strength of the 
presidential cycle under partisan control of both the Senate and the presidency: PDt  = 1 when there is 
partisan domination by either the Democrats or the Republicans over both the Senate and the 
presidency at time t, and zero otherwise. The absence of partisan domination is indicated by PSt  = 1 – 
PDt. Finally, we define two re-eligibility dummies REt and NREt = 1 – REt, with REt  = 1 when there is 
a re-eligible president in office at time t, and zero otherwise. 
 
 
 
 
C. Control Variables 
 
Since most of the variables examined in the propositions are influenced by business cycle 
fluctuations, this suggests the possibility that any observed pattern in stock returns over the 
presidential cycle may simply reflect the business cycle. To control for this, use several well-known 
business cycle proxies:  the annualized log dividend yield (DY), the term spread (TSP) between the 
yield to maturity of a 10-year Treasury note and the three-month Treasury bill, the quality spread 
(DSP) between yields of BAA- and AAA-rated corporate bonds, and the relative interest rate (RR) 
computed as the deviation of the three-month Treasury bill rate from its one-year moving average.  
The dividend yield as a business cycle proxy has been used before to capture time variation in 
expected stock returns, see for example Booth and Booth (2003). The intuition for this relation is that 
stock prices are low relative to dividends when discount rates and expected returns are high and vice 
versa (Fama, 1990).  Chen, Roll, and Ross (1986) argue that the spread of lower-grade and higher-
grade bonds is a good proxy for business cycle fluctuations. They argue that if business conditions are 
poor, spreads are likely to be large. According to Fama and French (1989), the term spread is a good 
proxy for the business cycle since it decreases (increases) near peaks (troughs) of economic activity.  
The fourth control variable, the relative interest rate, is included because many authors, including 
Campbell (1991) and Hodrick (1992), have noted that the level of short-term interest rates helps to 
forecast stock returns. However, since the short-term interest rate itself may be non-stationary over the 
sample period, it needs to be stochastically de-trended. Campbell (1991) suggests that the subtraction 
of a one-year moving average is a crude way to do this.   
 
 7
 
III. Main Findings 
 
 
A. Presidential cycle effect on U.S. stock markets 
 
We measure the effect of the presidential cycle on U.S. stock market returns by running the 
regression 
  tttttt YRYRYRYRr εββββ ++++= 44332211 ,                   (1) 
where the stock returns are denoted by tr  and the years in the presidential cycle by the dummy 
variables itYR  for i = 1,..,4. Under the null hypothesis the presidential cycle has no effect on stock 
market returns, which results in four similar beta coefficients. Table II presents the results. Panels A 
and B present the results without and with controlling for business cycle variables, respectively. We 
use Newey-West (1987) as well as bootstrapped p-values to test for significance. If the residuals are 
conditionally heteroskedastic, the finite-sample distributions of the t-statistics are better approximated 
by the bootstrap.5 
The results in Panel A of Table II reveal a clear presidential cycle effect for U.S. stock market 
returns over the years 1948 to 2004. On average, both excess and real returns in the first half of the 
presidential cycle are lower than returns in the second half of the cycle. Comparing the average 
annualized excess and real returns of the third year of the presidential cycle with the average 
annualized excess and real returns of the other three years, results in a difference of 13.82 and 13.46 
percent, respectively. Both differences are economically and statistically significant.  
The second year, by contrast, significantly underperforms the other years of the cycle. Comparing the 
average annualized excess and real returns of the second year of the presidential cycle with those of 
the other three years, we see an underperformance of 9.53 and 9.80 percent, respectively. The 
differences are economically significant, while statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
Furthermore, our robustness checks show that all differences in the second and third year of the cycle 
are significant and stable if we split the sample in two equally sized sub-samples. If we relocate the 
start of the cycle to January rather than November to account for the moment the new president 
actually obtains executive power, the effects remain robust, though the significance in year two 
compared to the other years drops from 5% to 10%. All differences also remain economically and 
                                               
5
 To obtain the p-values using bootstrapped standard errors, we conducted the following resampling procedure. First, 
regression (1) is run under the alternative hypothesis 4321:1 ββββ ≠≠≠H . A sample with replacement is drawn from the 
estimated residuals and used with the estimated coefficients to generate a pseudo-sample of bootstrapped returns. Next, the 
pseudo-sample is used to estimate the regression coefficients in (1). Repeating the process 1000 times, bootstrapped p-values 
can be computed. With two different p-values, a decision has to be made which p-value to believe. We follow Santa-Clara 
and Valkanov (2003) who state that it is most reliable (and conservative) to consider all results and use the maximum p-value 
in order to establish the significance of each test.  
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statistically significant after controlling for business cycle fluctuations, see Panel B. The lower returns 
in the second year followed by very high positive returns in the third year seem to support earlier 
findings on the existence of a presidential cycle effect in U.S. stock markets.  
 
B. Presidential cycle effect on the U.S. corporate bond market 
 
The contingent-claims approach implies that the debt claim (of a bondholder) has features 
similar to a short position in a put option (Merton, 1974). Credit spreads should therefore increase if 
either asset values decline or asset volatilities increase, see Collin-Drufesne, Goldstein and Martin, 
(2001). Moreover, credit spreads change in expected recovery rates. Altman and Kishore (1996) find 
that expected recovery rates are time-varying and a function of the overall business climate. Table III 
displays the monthly changes in the credit spread during the four years of the presidential cycle with 
and without controlling for business cycle variables. 
The results show a clear presidential cycle in credit spread changes. Credit spreads widen in 
the first half and shrink  in the second half of the cycle. Especially the second and the third year are 
significantly different. Comparing the second year of the cycle with the other three years of the cycle, 
we see an increase in credit spreads by on average 48 basis points. The third year, by contrast, displays 
a significant decline of spreads by on average 45 basis points. Both differences are statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level and robust to controlling for business cycle variables. Our main 
empirical findings also remain robust if we split the sample in two equally sized sub-samples. The 
differences between the different years in the cycle become even stronger during the second, more 
recent, sub-sample, indicating an increased presidential cycle effect for U.S. corporate bond markets in 
recent times. We thus corroborate the existence of a presidential cycle effect in both U.S. stock and 
bond markets. The key question that remains is whether this effect can indeed be attributed to the PCE 
theory. This is the question we address in the next section. 
 
IV.  Testing the PCE Theory 
As mentioned in the introduction, the presidential cycle effect on U.S. stock markets and the 
U.S. bond market is intriguing not only because of its economic significance, but also because there is 
no rational explanation for its existence. A tentative explanation is provided by the presidential cycle 
election (PCE) theory, see Hirsch (2007). In the following subsections, the PCE theory is examined 
empirically by testing seven propositions. The first four propositions have a financial, fiscal or macro-
economic character. Any economic manipulation by an incumbent president will be directly visible in 
these propositions. The final three propositions have a political nature and aim at uncovering the 
possible political mechanism behind the presidential cycle effect. 
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A. Formulation of Seven Testable Propositions 
 
Proposition 1: If the PCE theory holds, there will be a clear presidential cycle pattern in the 
growth of money supply. One way for the incumbent president to manipulate the economy is by 
applying an expansionary economic policy during the second half of the presidential cycle, thereby 
kicking the money-printing machines of the Federal Reserve into overdrive.6 After the elections, the 
growth of money supply would need to slow down, in order to counter the inflationary pressure caused 
by the expansionary policy. Thus, the growth of money supply (M1) would be higher during the 
second half of the presidential term compared to the first two years of the cycle. Chappell and Keech 
(1986) investigate the link between electoral politics and macroeconomic outcomes. They mainly 
focus on the relation between electoral politics and the growth of money supply (using M1) and find 
that electoral politics have a significant effect on the growth of money supply. However, their findings 
rest on limited data. Our current sample period, 1948:11-2004:10, consisting of 672 monthly 
observations, allows for a more robust analysis of the relation between the presidential cycle and the 
growth of money supply. 
Proposition 2: If the PCE theory holds, there will be a presidential cycle pattern visible in the 
U.S. income tax levels. The PCE theory states that stimulative fiscal policies will enhance the public’s 
sense of well-being prior to the presidential elections. A politically popular manipulation of the 
economy by the incumbent president is to lower the income tax levels prior to the elections.7 
According to the PCE theory, average income tax levels should be lower during the second half of the 
presidential cycle compared to the first. 
Proposition 3: According to the PCE theory, U.S. federal spending will increase during the 
second half of the presidential cycle and decrease during the first half of the cycle. The economic 
manipulations by the incumbent president, consisting of stimulative fiscal measures and corporate 
friendly policies, should have a direct impact on U.S. federal spending. The PCE theory states that 
expansionary policies conducted prior to the elections will result in an accelerating growth of U.S. 
federal spending during the third and fourth year of the cycle. After the elections, the elected president 
will slow down the growth of U.S. federal spending to counter the fiscal hang-over. 
Proposition 4: If the PCE theory holds, there will be a climbing U.S. budget deficit during the 
second half of the presidential cycle and a shrinking deficit during the first half of the cycle. The 
economic manipulations by the incumbent president during the second half of the presidential term 
will lead to higher federal outlays (increased spending) and lower federal income (cutting of taxes), 
thereby increasing the U.S. budget deficit (or decreasing a budget surplus). The growth in budget 
                                               
6
 Although the Federal Reserve has considerable formal autonomy under U.S. American institutional arrangements, its 
insulation from political direction is largely illusory. Numerous studies have concluded that the administration’s 
macroeconomic goals are what drive the Federal Reserve policy behaviour, as contrasted to Federal Reserve policy rhetoric 
(Hibbs, 1977).   
7
 Another popular measure for the incumbent president would be to lower corporate taxes prior to the elections. However, 
this hypothesis is harder to test given limited historical data availability. 
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deficit will decrease (or even disappear) during the first half of the cycle, when federal outlays are 
reduced and federal income is increased. However, Wong and McAleer (2007) argue that an 
incumbent president enhances his chances of re-election by lowering the budget deficit prior to the 
presidential elections, instead of raising it. They state that the fourth year of the cycle will therefore 
display a decreasing budget deficit (or increasing surplus).  
Proposition 5: According to the PCE theory, the partisanship of the presidency will have no 
impact on the strength of the presidential cycle effect. The PCE theory states that the impact of the 
presidential cycle effect on U.S. stock market returns is similar under Democratic and Republican 
administrations, since both have the same objective when manipulating the economy, namely 
enhancing their chances on re-election. These statements are based on the political business cycle 
theory developed by Nordhaus (1975), who argues that presidential administrations have an incentive 
to manipulate the economy prior to elections, regardless of the political orientation of the incumbent 
administration. However, Hibbs (1977) and Alesina and Sachs (1988) reject this pure political 
business cycle theory and find evidence for the existence of a partisan business cycle theory. Alesina 
and Sachs (1988) state that in American national politics, the core constituency of the Democratic 
Party consists of the down-scale classes, who primarily hold human capital and bear a disproportionate 
share of the economic and broader social costs of extra unemployment. Up-scale groups form the core 
constituency of the Republican Party, hold financial capital and absorb the greatest losses from extra 
inflation. For this reason Democratic voters generally express greater aversion to unemployment and 
less aversion to inflation than Republican voters. The partisanship of the administration therefore 
determines the policy pursued to manipulate the economy. According to Hibbs (1977) and Alesina and 
Sachs (1988), this results in different returns under Democratic or Republican administrations. A 
recent study by Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) confirms the existence of such a partisan business 
cycle theory in U.S. stock markets. However, it is unclear if this partisan business cycle has any 
influence on the presidential cycle effect. In other words, it is not clear whether there are any 
significant differences in the effect of the presidential cycle on U.S. stock market returns under 
Democratic or Republican administrations. 
Proposition 6: If the PCE theory holds, the impact of the presidential cycle effect on U.S. stock 
market returns will be stronger when the president and the majority of Congress share the same party 
affiliation. The PCE theory states that the incumbent president will manipulate the economy prior to 
the presidential elections. However, Yantek (1986) argues that the degree of manipulation feasible is 
largely dependent on Congress, since most taxing and spending initiatives are initiated and decided 
there. The degree of manipulation by the incumbent president is therefore largely dependent on the 
partisanship of the majority of Congress. If the president and the majority of Congress share the same 
party affiliation, it should be easier for the president to manipulate the economy thereby increasing the 
strength of the presidential cycle effect on U.S. stock market returns. However, to date, no academic 
studies tested the Congressional influence on the presidential cycle effect. By empirically examining 
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this Congressional influence on the presidential cycle effect, this study enlightens the political 
mechanism behind the presidential cycle effect. 
Proposition 7: If the PCE theory holds, the impact of the presidential cycle effect on U.S. stock 
market returns will be stronger when there is a re-eligible president in office. Although this 
proposition is not directly stated in the PCE theory, it has great value in establishing the political 
credibility of the PCE theory. According to the PCE theory, the strength of the presidential cycle effect 
is largely dependent on the degree of economic manipulation by an incumbent president. The incentive 
of the incumbent president, namely enhancing his chances on re-election, is fully dependent on his 
eligibility status. Since the U.S. constitution limits a president to a maximum of two terms in office, he 
will automatically loose the ability to be re-elected after serving two presidential terms. It is therefore 
possible that a non re-eligible president has far less incentive to manipulate the economy compared to 
a re-eligible president. Hence, prior to the elections there will be less economic manipulations when a 
non re-eligible president is in office. Simultaneously, the post-election effect (bearish stock markets in 
the first two year of the cycle) will also be smaller compared to elections with a re-eligible president. 
 
B. Empirical Findings 
 
Table IV displays the results for the first set of our seven propositions. Note that we include 
the controls for business cycle fluctuations in the regressions. Panel A reports the findings for the full 
sample period, but displays no presidential cycle effect in the growth of money supply. The growth of 
money supply is lower in the first year (-0.23 percent) and the fourth year (-0.62 percent) of the cycle. 
By contrast, the second year (0.38 percent) and third year (0.46 percent) of the cycle indicate an 
accelerating growth of the money supply. This pattern is inconsistent with the presence of a 
presidential cycle effect. Furthermore, none of these findings are statistically significant. Sub-sample 
regressions indicate similar results, but are omitted in the interest of brevity. The empirical findings 
reject our first proposition and are therefore not supportive of the PCE theory. 
Panel B of Table IV reports the results for U.S. income tax levels during the four year 
presidential cycle. Since income tax levels are linked to the duration of a fiscal year, all regressions on 
income tax levels are based on annual data. Although one might expect income tax levels to be rather 
static, they actually changed quite often during our sample period.8 Therefore, we focus on the lowest 
income tax level (Tax low), the highest income tax level (Tax high) and the change in all income tax 
levels (Tax change). The results indicate no presidential cycle effect in U.S. tax income levels. When 
comparing the four years of the presidential cycle, there are no statistically significant differences in 
either the lowest income tax level, the highest income tax level or the change in all tax levels. On 
average, the lowest tax bracket is 0.34 percent higher during the third year of the cycle and 0.43 
                                               
8
 During the full sample period, which consists of 14 full presidential cycles, there were 10 alterations in the lowest U.S. tax 
income level and 18 alterations in the highest U.S. tax income level.  
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percent higher during the fourth year of the cycle. The highest tax bracket also indicates higher 
average tax levels during the third year (2.30 percent) and fourth year (1.32 percent) of the cycle. 
These findings do not support the existence of a presidential cycle effect. Results for the average 
change in all tax levels show a deviating pattern with an increase in tax levels by 0.81 percent during 
the first year of the cycle, and a decrease of tax levels by 0.56 percent during the fourth year of the 
cycle. So overall, we conclude that there is no presidential cycle effect present in U.S. income tax 
levels. 
Panel B also displays the  yearly change in U.S. federal spending during the four years of the 
presidential cycle. The  changes in federal spending are expressed in annualized percentage points. 
When comparing a specific year with the other three years of the cycle, we find a slower growth of 
federal spending in the first three years of the cycle, but an accelerating growth of federal spending in 
the fourth year (3.28 percent) of the cycle. Although the signs of these findings are somewhat 
supportive for the presence of a presidential cycle effect, they are not statistically significant.  
The negative signs of the U.S. budget surplus coefficients, presented in Panel B, indicate that 
the U.S. budget, on average, deteriorated during all four years of the cycle. The U.S. budget deficit is 
negative on average in all four years of the cycle. The first and last year, however, are somewhat less 
negative compared to the other years of the cycle. In the second and third year, by contrast, the budget 
deficit is 1.62 percentage points higher compared to the other years of the cycle. Expressing the budget 
deficit as a percentage of U.S. total debt results in a similar pattern. The fourth year indicates a lower 
budget deficit by 2.16 percent (expressed as a percentage of GDP) compared to the other three years of 
the cycle. This seems to support the theory of Wong and McAleer (2007), who argue that a president 
artificially reduces the budget deficit prior to the elections. Again, however, the results are not 
statistically significant  
Table V displays the results for the three political propositions after controlling for business 
cycle variables. Panel A presents the average excess returns under Democratic and Republican 
administrations during the presidential cycle for the full sample period of 1948 to 2004. As expected, 
the excess returns of the S&P 500 display a presidential cycle effect, consisting of lower average 
returns in the first two years of the cycle compared to the last two years, both under Democratic and 
Republican presidencies. The signs of the differences indicate an overall outperformance under 
Democratic administrations, which confirms earlier findings by Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003). But 
since none of the differences are statistically significant, no clear impact of the partisanship of the 
president on the strength of the presidential cycle is detected, thereby supporting the PCE theory. 
Panel B of Table V reports the average excess returns under partisan domination and partisan 
split of control over the presidency and the majority of the Senate during the four years of the 
presidential cycle. The excess returns of the S&P 500 display a presidential cycle effect, consisting of 
lower average returns in the first two years of the cycle compared to the last two years, under both 
partisan domination and partisan split of control. If the PCE theory would be valid, average returns 
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under partisan domination would indicate a stronger presidential cycle effect, consisting of even lower 
average returns during the first two years and even higher average returns during the last two years of 
the cycle. The third and fourth year of the cycle indicate a slight outperformance of excess returns 
under partisan domination, while the first year reports a slight underperformance of partisan 
domination. Although these findings are in accordance with the PCE theory, none of the differences 
are statistically significant. Furthermore, the second year shows a deviating pattern with an 
economically significant outperformance of 13.29 percent under partisan domination, which also lacks 
statistical significance. Thus, there is no statistically significant evidence in average excess returns 
under partisan domination or partisan split during the four years of the presidential cycle. We can thus 
not confirm the Congressional influence on the strength of the presidential cycle effect. 
Panel C of Table V presents the average excess returns when there is a re-eligible president in 
office and when there is none. In order to support the PCE theory, there should be a stronger 
presidential cycle effect on stock market returns when there is a re-eligible president in office. The 
findings presented in Panel C indicate lower excess returns during the first half of the cycle and higher 
excess returns during the second half of the cycle when there is a re-eligible president in office. Hence, 
these findings are supportive for the PCE theory. However, only the difference in the second year is 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Furthermore, none of the financial, fiscal or macro-
economic variables indicate any statistically significant differences in economic manipulation between 
a re-eligible president and a non re-eligible president.9 Overall, we find little to no statistically 
significant evidence to support the credibility of the PCE theory. 
 
V.  Conclusions  
 
This paper documents the existence of the presidential cycle effect on U.S. stock markets and 
the U.S. bond market. Average excess returns of the S&P 500 in the second half of the presidential 
cycle are significantly higher compared to those in the first half. More notably, the average excess 
returns in the second year underperform the other years in the cycle by 9.53 percent, while the third 
year outperforms the other years by 13.82 percent. We show that the presidential cycle effect in stock 
markets is mirrored in U.S. corporate bond markets. Changes in the credit spread indicate a pattern 
influenced by the presidential cycle. On average, the credit spread widens by 48 basis point in the 
second year, while it shrinks by 45 basis points in the third year of the cycle. The results are 
statistically and economically significant, stable over sub-samples, and robust to controlling for 
business cycle effects  We conclude that the presidential cycle effect in U.S. stock and bond markets is 
a robust phenomenon. 
                                               
9
 Results available upon request.  
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We also tested the presidential cycle election theory (PCE theory) as a potential explanation 
for the presidential cycle effect using seven different propositions. After a thorough empirical analysis, 
there is little to no financial, fiscal or macro-economic evidence for any economic manipulation by an 
incumbent president. Neither the growth of money supply, U.S. income tax levels, U.S. federal 
spending, nor the U.S. budget indicate a statistically significant presidential cycle pattern. 
Furthermore, the political propositions we tested fail to uncover any significant evidence for the 
political background behind the presidential cycle effect. The credibility of the PCE theory as an 
explanation for the presidential cycle is therefore limited. 
As a result, the existence of the presidential cycle effect in U.S. financial markets remains a 
puzzle and certainly deserves further academic attention. However, since most rational explanations as 
well as the PCE theory fail to solve the puzzle, alternative explanations become scarce. One possibility 
is that certain untested elements of the PCE theory are responsible for the presidential cycle effect. For 
instance, the economy could stall in the first two years of a new presidential term due to the president 
learning how to become efficient and productive in his new role. The president would overcome this 
steep learning curve halfway in his term, thereby launching economic prosperity during the second 
half of the cycle. Another example is based on investor sentiments documented in behavioral finance. 
Investors could be banking on the promises presidential candidates make, and then pull out of the 
market once those promises are not immediately fulfilled. However, this implies that economic agents 
make the same valuation errors based on sentiment cycle after cycle, which is irrational in an efficient 
markets sense. The maintenance of the presidential cycle would therefore require an additional 
assumption, such as investor myopia or cognitive biases. 
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Table I 
Summary Statistics of Financial and Control Variables 
Table I reports the averages (Mean), standard deviations (Std. Dev.), and autoregressive coefficients 
(A.R.) of the financial and control variables used in this study. Stock returns are recomputed in a 
logarithmic form, while all means are displayed in annualized percentage points. For the excess 
return on the S&P 500 (SP500 – TBL), the real return on the S&P 500 (SP500 – INF), the  monthly 
change in the credit spread (Credit spread) and the  yearly growth in money supply (M1 growth), the 
full sample period consists of 672 monthly observations (1948:11 - 2004:10). The same sample 
periods apply for the control variables used in this study, namely the dividend yield (DY), the 
quality spread (DSP), the term spread (TSP) and the relative interest rate (RR). For tax levels (Tax 
low, Tax high and Tax change), federal spending (Fed. spending) and budget surplus (Budget 
surplus / GDP and Budget surplus / Total debt) the full sample period consists of 56 yearly 
observations (1949-2004). 
 
  Full Sample  
Series   Mean Std.Dev. A.R. 
SP500 - TBL  2.81 14.48 0.02 
SP500 - INF  3.87 14.58 0.04 
     
Credit spread  0.02 0.57 0.18 
M1 growth  4.59 3.89 0.99 
Tax low  15.24 3.32 0.99 
Tax high  62.98 22.02 0.99 
Tax change  -0.98 4.82 0.24 
Fed. spending  8.36 8.10 0.52 
Budget surplus / GDP  -2.90 15.37 0.31 
Budget surplus / Total Debt  -0.01 0.03 0.57 
     
DY  -3.40 0.42 1.00 
DSP  0.92 0.04 1.00 
TSP  1.56 0.02 0.98 
RR   0.00 0.01 0.90 
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Table II 
Average Returns and Differences during the Presidential Cycle, Controlling for Business 
Cycle Variables 
Table II presents returns and differences in returns during the presidential cycle for the entire sample period. Panel A 
reports the returns and differences in returns during the four year presidential cycle, not controlling for business cycle 
fluctuations. The “Returns” columns report the mean excess returns of the S&P 500 (SP500 – TBL) and the mean real 
returns of the S&P 500 (SP500 – INF), for all four years of the presidential cycle. All rates are represented in annualized 
percentage points. The coefficients under the “Returns” columns represent the average annualized return in a specific year 
of the presidential cycle. The first number under the coefficient represents the p-value under the null hypothesis that the 
coefficient estimates are not significantly different from zero. These p-values are obtained by using Newey-West (1987) t-
statistics. The numbers in square brackets are the p-values of the test conducted using a conditional bootstrap t-statistic. 
The “Differences” columns report the differences between the average annualized return in one specific year of the 
presidential cycle and the average annualized return in the other three years of the cycle. This indicates whether or not a 
specific year differs significantly from the rest of the cycle. The p-values below the coefficients in the “Differences” 
columns are obtained from the Wald test, under the null that there is no difference in returns between a specific year in the 
presidential cycle and the other three years of the cycle. The numbers in square brackets are the p-values of the test 
conducted using a conditional bootstrap t-statistic. The row “ 2R  “ displays the  adjusted R² obtained in the regressions. 
Panel B displays the returns and differences in returns during the four year presidential cycle, after controlling for business 
cycle fluctuations. Controlling for business cycle fluctuations results in the following regression: 
tttttttt XYRYRYRYRTBLSP εγββββ +++++=− '500 44332211 , where tX  is a vector containing the 
following control variables: the log dividend yield (DY), the quality spread (DSP), the term spread (TSP), and the relative 
interest rate (RR).  To make the means directly comparable with those in Panel A, all conditioning variables in tX are 
demeaned. All numbers in Panel B are obtained in a similar manner as the numbers in Panel A.  
 
Full Sample (1948:11 - 2004:10, 672 observations) 
Panel A: Without Controlling for Business Cycle Variables 
  Returns  Differences 
    Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4   Yr.1 - 2,3,4 Yr.2 - 1,3,4 Yr.3 - 1,2,4 Yr.4 - 1,2,3 
SP500 - TBL  -2.44 -4.33 13.18 4.84  -7.00 -9.53 13.82 2.71 
  0.50 0.40 0.00 0.03  0.10 0.08 0.00 0.42 
  [ 0.53 ] [ 0.26 ] [ 0.00 ] [ 0.20 ]  [ 0.13 ] [ 0.03 ] [ 0.00 ] [ 0.54 ] 
SP500 - INF  -0.75 -3.48 13.97 5.76  -6.17 -9.80 13.46 2.51 
  0.84 0.51 0.00 0.01  0.16 0.08 0.00 0.46 
  [ 0.84 ] [ 0.37 ] [ 0.00 ] [ 0.15 ]  [ 0.17 ] [ 0.03 ] [ 0.00 ] [ 0.58 ] 
2R   0.02      
Panel B: Controlling for Business Cycle Variables 
  Returns  Differences 
    Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4   Yr.1 - 2,3,4 Yr.2 - 1,3,4 Yr.3 - 1,2,4 Yr.4 - 1,2,3 
SP500 - TBL  -1.09 -7.12 12.39 5.59  -4.65 -12.79 13.24 3.87 
  0.78 0.15 0.00 0.04  0.31 0.01 0.00 0.27 
  [ 0.78 ] [ 0.07 ] [ 0.00 ] [ 0.17 ]  [ 0.28 ] [ 0.00 ] [ 0.00 ] [ 0.38 ] 
SP500 - INF  0.98 -6.04 13.29 6.74  -3.63 -13.09 12.72 3.67 
  0.81 0.24 0.00 0.01  0.43 0.01 0.00 0.30 
  [ 0.80 ] [ 0.12 ] [ 0.00 ] [ 0.09 ]  [ 0.42 ] [ 0.00 ] [ 0.00 ] [ 0.43 
2R    0.05           
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Table III 
 Change in Credit Spread during the Presidential Cycle 
Table III presents the changes in the credit spread and the differences in these changes during the four years of the presidential 
cycle for the full sample period. Panel A reports the findings, not controlling for business cycle fluctuations. The “Change in 
Spread” columns report the  monthly change in the credit spread for all four years of the presidential cycle. All changes are 
displayed in annualized percentage points. The coefficients under the “Change in Spread” columns represent the  annualized 
change in the credit spread in a specific year of the presidential cycle. The first number under the coefficient represents the p-
value under the null hypothesis that the coefficient estimates are not significantly different from zero. These p-value are obtained 
by using Newey-West (1987) t-statistics. The numbers in square brackets are the p-values of the test conducted using a 
conditional bootstrap t-statistic. The “Differences” columns report the differences between the  annualized change in the credit 
spread in one specific year of the presidential cycle and the  annualized change in the credit spread in the other three years of the 
cycle. This indicates whether or not a specific year differs significantly from the rest of the cycle. The p-values below the 
coefficients in the “Differences” columns are obtained from the Wald test, under the null that there is no difference in the change 
in the credit spread between a specific year in the presidential cycle and the other three years of the cycle. The numbers in square 
brackets are the p-values of the test conducted using a conditional bootstrap t-statistic. The row “ 2R  “ displays the  adjusted R² 
obtained in the regressions. Panel B reports the changes in the credit spread and the differences in these changes during the 
presidential cycle, after controlling for business cycle variables. The impact of business cycle fluctuations is tested by running the 
following regression: ttttttt XYRYRYRYRSpreadCredit εγββββ +++++= '_ 44332211 , where tX is a vector 
containing the following control variables, namely the log dividend yield (DY), the quality spread (DSP), the term spread (TSP) 
and the relative interest rate (RR). The estimates of γ  are not displayed in the interest of conciseness. All numbers in Panel B are 
obtained in a similar manner as the numbers in Panel A. 
 
Full Sample (1948:11 - 2004:10, 672 observations) 
Panel A: Without Controlling for Business Cycle Variables 
  Change in Spread  Differences 
    Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4   Yr.1 - 2,3,4 Yr.2 - 1,3,4 Yr.3 - 1,2,4 Yr.4 - 1,2,3 
Credit Spread  0.02 0.37 -0.32 -0.01  0.01 0.48 -0.45 -0.03 
  0.83 0.04 0.04 0.97  0.96 0.02 0.01 0.86 
  [ 0.88 ] [ 0.01 ] [ 0.03 ] [ 0.97 ]  [ 0.97 ] [ 0.01 ] [ 0.01 ] [ 0.86 ] 
2R   0.02      
Panel B: Controlling for Business Cycle Variables 
  Change in Spread  Differences 
    Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4   Yr.1 - 2,3,4 Yr.2 - 1,3,4 Yr.3 - 1,2,4 Yr.4 - 1,2,3 
Credit Spread  0.04 0.34 -0.30 0.15  -0.03 0.38 -0.47 0.14 
  0.82 0.05 0.11 0.34  0.04 0.04 0.01 0.38 
  [ 0.82 ] [ 0.02 ] [ 0.05 ] [ 0.32 ]  [ 0.02 ] [ 0.02 ] [ 0.01 ] [ 0.41 ] 
2R    0.07           
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Table IV  
Financial Variables during the Presidential Cycle 
Table IV displays the financial variables of the tested propositions during the four years of the presidential cycle, after controlling for 
business cycle variables. The impact of business cycle fluctuations is tested by running the following regression: 
ttttttt XYRYRYRYRVariable εγββββ +++++= '44332211 , where tX is a vector containing the control variables, namely the log 
dividend yield (DY), the quality spread (DSP), the term spread (TSP), and the relative interest rate (RR). The estimates of γ  are not 
displayed in the interest of conciseness. Panel A presents the results for variables measured in monthly observations, while Panel B 
reports the results for variables measured in yearly observations. The “Changes” columns report monthly or yearly observations of the 
financial variables for all four years of the presidential cycle. ‘M1 Growth’ represents the  annualized growth in money supply. ‘Tax 
low’ is the average income tax level for the lowest tax bracket, ‘Tax high’ displays the highest bracket, while ‘Tax change’ represents 
the combined  change in these brackets. ‘Federal spending’ reports the  yearly change in federal spending. ‘Budget surplus / GDP’ 
represents the  change in the budget surplus or deficit as a percentage of GDP, while ‘Budget surplus / Total debt’ reports the  change in 
the budget surplus or deficit as a percentage of total debt. The coefficients under the first four columns represent the  annualized change 
of a financial variable in a specific year of the presidential cycle. The p-values are obtained by using Newey-West (1987) t-statistics. 
The numbers in square brackets are the p-values of the test conducted using a conditional bootstrap t-statistic. The last four columns 
report the differences between the  annualized change of a financial variable in one specific year of the presidential cycle and the  
annualized change in a financial variable in the other three years of the cycle. The p-values below the coefficients are obtained from the 
Wald test, under the null that there is no difference in the change of a financial variable between a specific year in the presidential cycle 
and the other three years of the cycle. All numbers in Panel B are obtained in a similar manner as the numbers in Panel A.  
 
Panel A: Full Sample based on Monthly Observations (1948:11 - 2004:10, 672 observations) 
  Changes  Differences 
    Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4   Yr.1 - 2,3,4 Yr.2 - 1,3,4 Yr.3 - 1,2,4 Yr.4 - 1,2,3 
M1 Growth  5.49 5.95 6.00 5.20  -0.23 0.38 0.46 -0.62 
  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.75 0.52 0.46 0.33 
  [ 0.00 ] [ 0.00 ] [ 0.00 ] [ 0.00 ]  [ 0.45 ] [ 0.29 ] [ 0.30 ] [ 0.23 ] 
Panel B: Full Sample based on Yearly Observations (1949 - 2004, 56 observations) 
  Changes  Differences 
    Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4   Yr.1 - 2,3,4 Yr.2 - 1,3,4 Yr.3 - 1,2,4 Yr.4 - 1,2,3 
Tax low  14.15 14.34 14.80 14.87  -0.52 -0.27 0.34 0.43 
  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.27 0.61 0.53 0.37 
  [ 0.00 ] [ 0.00 ] [ 0.00 ] [ 0.00 ]  [ 0.36 ] [ 0.77 ] [ 0.59 ] [ 0.44 ] 
Tax high  60.58 60.39 63.60 62.88  -1.69 -1.95 2.30 1.32 
  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.47 0.51 0.40 0.59 
  [ 0.00 ] [ 0.00 ] [ 0.00 ] [ 0.00 ]  [ 0.57 ] [ 0.65 ] [ 0.57 ] [ 0.72 ] 
Tax change  -1.00 -2.48 -0.93 -2.02  0.81 -1.17 0.92 -0.56 
  0.34 0.13 0.43 0.14  0.48 0.46 0.46 0.71 
  [ 0.49 ] [ 0.08 ] [ 0.45 ] [ 0.10 ]  [ 0.54 ] [ 0.53 ] [ 0.61 ] [ 0.74 ] 
Fed. spending  9.65 7.83 9.17 12.17  -0.04 -2.48 -0.74 3.28 
  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.98 0.24 0.70 0.32 
  [ 0.00 ] [ 0.00 ] [ 0.00 ] [ 0.00 ]  [ 0.91 ] [ 0.29 ] [ 0.80 ] [ 0.24 ] 
Budget surplus / GDP  -5.07 -7.12 -7.12 -4.29  1.13 -1.62 -1.62 2.16 
  0.29 0.02 0.12 0.32  0.82 0.77 0.77 0.66 
  [ 0.26 ] [ 0.08 ] [ 0.06 ] [ 0.28 ]  [ 0.84 ] [ 0.77 ] [ 0.76 ] [ 0.70 ] 
Budget surplus / 
Total debt 
 
-0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 
 
0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 
  0.37 0.00 0.03 0.14  0.31 0.63 0.36 0.79 
  [ 0.39 ] [ 0.03 ] [ 0.00 ] [ 0.07 ]  [ 0.34 ] [ 0.80 ] [ 0.39 ] [ 0.81 ] 
2R    0.30           
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Table V 
Average Returns under Political Propositions during the Presidential Cycle 
Table V presents returns and differences in returns during the presidential cycle under the political propositions after controlling for business cycle variables. The impact of business cycle fluctuations is tested by 
running the following regression: ttttttt XYRYRYRYRVariable εγββββ +++++= '44332211 , where tX is a vector containing the control variables, namely the log dividend yield (DY), the quality spread 
(DSP), the term spread (TSP), and the relative interest rate (RR). The estimates of γ  are not displayed in the interest of conciseness. Panel A reports the returns under Democratic and Republican presidents. The 
first rows report the average excess returns (SP500 – TBL) of the S&P 500 under both Democratic presidents (DP) and Republican presidents (RP), during all four years of the presidential cycle. All rates are 
represented in annualized percentage points. The p-values are obtained by using Newey-West (1987) t-statistics. The numbers in square brackets are the p-values of the test conducted using a conditional 
bootstrap t-statistic. The row “T / Democrats” displays the number of observations and the number of months of Democratic administrations during the estimation period. Panel B reports the returns and 
differences in returns during the presidential cycle under partisan domination (PD) and partisan split (PS) of control over the presidency and the Senate. Panel C displays the returns and differences in returns 
during the presidential cycle when a  re-eligible president is in office (RE) and when there is no re-eligible president in office (NRE). All numbers in Panel B and Panel C are obtained in a similar manner as the 
numbers in Panel A.  
 
Panel A: Full Sample (1948:11 - 2004:10, 672 observations) 
  Returns under Democratic and Republican presidents  Differences between DP and RP 
    Year 1 x DP Year 1 x RP Year 2 x DP Year 2 x RP Year 3 x DP Year 3 x RP Year 4 x DP Year 4 x RP   Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 
SP500 - TBL  6.78 -4.19 1.80 -12.15 18.08 9.46 11.38 3.34  10.97 13.95 8.62 8.05 
  0.23 0.44 0.77 0.11 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.40  0.18 0.28 0.29 0.24 
  [ 0.20 ] [ 0.51 ] [ 0.72 ] [ 0.05 ] [ 0.00 ] [ 0.14 ] [ 0.03 ] [ 0.59 ]  [ 0.24 ] [ 0.19 ] [ 0.35 ] [ 0.32 ] 
T / Democrats 
  
672 / 288 
          
 
 
Panel B: Returns under Partisan Domination and Partisan Split  Differences between PD and PS 
  
  
Year 1 x PD Year 1 x PS Year 2 x PD Year 2 x PS Year 3 x PD Year 3 x PS Year 4 x PD Year 4 x PS   Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 
SP500 - TBL  1.78 7.49 1.35 -11.94 15.37 12.73 10.50 4.88  -5.71 13.29 2.63 5.62 
  0.74 0.25 0.83 0.19 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.20  0.43 0.23 0.74 0.21 
  [ 0.74 ] [ 0.24 ] [ 0.79 ] [ 0.06 ] [ 0.03 ] [ 0.07 ] [ 0.03 ] [ 0.37 ]  [ 0.50 ] [ 0.14 ] [ 0.78 ] [ 0.36 ] 
T / Partisan Dom. 
  
672 / 264 
          
 
 
Panel C: Returns under Re-eligible President in Office and No Re-eligible President in Office  Differences between RE and NRE 
  
  
Year 1 x RE Year 1 x NRE Year 2 x RE Year 2 x NRE Year 3 x RE Year 3 x NRE Year 4 x RE Year 4 x NRE   Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 
SP500 - TBL  -1.42 0.62 -14.58 7.73 13.63 10.94 7.23 3.12  -2.04 -22.31 2.70 4.12 
  0.78 0.92 0.01 0.24 0.00 0.11 0.02 0.48  0.81 0.01 0.70 0.38 
  [ 0.83 ] [ 0.90 ] [ 0.03 ] [ 0.10 ] [ 0.04 ] [ 0.02 ] [ 0.18 ] [ 0.52 ]  [ 0.82 ] [ 0.00 ] [ 0.72 ] [ 0.48 ] 
T / First Term 
 
672 / 432 
     
 R²   0.06           
 
 
